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YTT Secunet

Status / Data planes and control plane

System status

Gateway availability for every regional data plane, plus the policy engine, receipt notary, Merkle publisher and console. Incident history covers the last 90 days.

All systems operational

Checked 6 Nov 2026, 13:45 UTC

  • EU Frankfurt
  • EU Paris
  • UK
  • CH
  • GCC
  • APAC
  • US
  • Gateway
  • Policy
  • Notary
  • Merkle
  • Console

Gateway uptime by region, last 90 days

  • EU FrankfurtFrankfurt am Main, DEData plane and primary control plane99.995%
    90 days agoToday
  • EU ParisParis, FRStandby control plane and data plane100%
    90 days agoToday
  • UKLondon, GBData plane99.998%
    90 days agoToday
  • CHZurich, CHData plane100%
    90 days agoToday
  • GCCRiyadh, SAData plane99.989%
    90 days agoToday
  • APACSingapore, SGData plane99.993%
    90 days agoToday
  • USVirginia, USData plane99.997%
    90 days agoToday

Components

  • GatewayAll data planesIngress, routing, failover99.996%
    90 days agoToday
  • Policy engineIn-process OPA, every data planeRego evaluation and decision logs100%
    90 days agoToday
  • Receipt notaryEvery data planeEd25519 receipt signing100%
    90 days agoToday
  • Merkle publisherEU control planeHourly SHA-256 root publication99.91%
    90 days agoToday
  • ConsoleEU control planeWeb console, API keys, exports99.97%
    90 days agoToday

Published Merkle roots, EU control plane

Every receipt signed in an hour becomes a leaf in that hour's SHA-256 Merkle tree. The root is published shortly after the hour closes, and an inclusion proof links any receipt to it.

A late root does not mean lost receipts: they are signed and returned on every response in real time. It only delays when an auditor can check inclusion with ytt-verify.

Cryptographic proofs
BatchLeavesRoot (SHA-256)Published
2026-11-06T12:00Z1,204,11872f80f63119e8bc9...6218d8c313:02 UTC
2026-11-06T11:00Z1,187,402fa9ae821544de62e...95a7eb3b12:01 UTC
2026-11-06T10:00Z1,162,95563b44de7ab13c483...b1c6177011:02 UTC
2026-11-06T09:00Z1,091,337fbd7a221fde338e8...873e68d910:01 UTC
2026-11-06T08:00Z978,6047371836320a59f4d...491f0cd309:03 UTC
2026-11-06T07:00Z802,211fb1364216576f2aa...bea03f2b08:02 UTC

Incident and maintenance history

  1. 3 Nov 2026

    Maintenance

    Console, control plane

    20 minutes

    Control plane failover drill, Frankfurt to Paris

    1. Scheduled05:00 UTCQuarterly drill: the Paris standby takes over the EU control plane. Data planes keep routing; the console is read-only during the switch.
    2. Completed05:20 UTCSwitch over and back completed. Console was read-only for 4 minutes in total. No routing impact.

  2. 14 Oct 2026

    Degraded performance

    Merkle publisher

    1 hour 52 minutes

    Merkle root publication delayed

    1. Investigating10:07 UTCThe 09:00 UTC hourly root has not been published. Receipts continue to be signed and returned on every response.
    2. Identified10:31 UTCA storage quota on the publication bucket blocked the write. Quota raised; publication job restarted.
    3. Monitoring10:47 UTCRoots for 09:00 and 10:00 UTC published, 47 minutes late. Inclusion proofs for both batches verify.
    4. Resolved11:59 UTCTwo subsequent hourly roots published on time. Alerting now fires at 10 minutes of delay instead of 30.

  3. 23 Sep 2026

    Degraded performance

    Gateway, policy engine (EU Frankfurt)

    18 minutes

    Gateway latency above objective in EU Frankfurt

    1. Investigating14:12 UTCp99 added latency in EU Frankfurt rose above our 8 ms objective.
    2. Identified14:19 UTCA gateway release evicted the policy bundle cache too often, forcing repeated bundle verification. Rolling back.
    3. Resolved14:30 UTCRollback complete, latency back under objective. Routing decisions were unaffected and no request left the EU.

  4. 2 Sep 2026

    Partial outage

    Console

    41 minutes

    SAML sign-in errors in the console

    1. Investigating08:05 UTCSome workspaces using SAML SSO see an invalid signature error at sign-in. Email sign-in links work.
    2. Identified08:22 UTCOur service provider signing certificate rotated before every identity provider refreshed metadata.
    3. Resolved08:46 UTCPrevious certificate re-enabled alongside the new one. Rotation now runs with a 30-day overlap.

  5. 19 Aug 2026

    Partial outage

    Gateway (GCC)

    14 minutes

    Fail-closed responses in the GCC data plane

    1. Investigating21:03 UTCTenants on saudi-pdpl-sovereign with a single in-Kingdom endpoint receive HTTP 503.
    2. Identified21:09 UTCUpstream endpoint maintenance overran. Policy correctly refused failover outside the Kingdom; requests failed closed with signed denial receipts.
    3. Resolved21:17 UTCUpstream endpoint healthy. Affected tenants were offered a second in-Kingdom endpoint as a failover pair.

Sovereign route ready

Failover that never leaves the jurisdiction.

When a region degrades, YTT Secunet fails over inside the legal boundary or fails closed with a signed receipt.

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